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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ARTICLE I, SECTION 9-PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-RIGHT To REFUSE A FIELD SOBRI-
ETY TEsT-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination grounded in Article I, Section 9 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution does not encompass a right to
refuse a field sobriety test.
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1996)
In early 1993, a Narbeth town police officer observed Samuel
G. Hayes ("Hayes") driving erratically.1 The officer pursued the
vehicle until Hayes came to a stop in his driveway.2 When Hayes
exited his vehicle, the officer requested to see some form of iden-
tification.' Upon observing Hayes' demeanor, the officer believed
him to be under the influence of alcohol and requested Hayes to
perform several field sobriety tests.4 The officer subsequently
determined Hayes to be incapable of successfully performing the
various tests and placed him under arrest.5
At trial, a jury convicted Hayes of violating a state statute
prohibiting individuals from driving under the influence of alco-
hol.6 Hayes was fined three hundred dollars and sentenced to a
prison term of forty-eight hours to twelve months.7 The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, which heard the case on appeal,
1. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 678 (Pa. 1996). The arresting officer
observed Hayes driving in the wrong lane of traffic and proceeding toward the officer. Id.
2. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 678. After moving his vehicle into the correct lane, Hayes
waved and smiled at the passing officer. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The officer observed Hayes as having red and glassy eyes, slurred speech,
inadequate balance and an alcohol stench. Id.
5. Id. The officer administered the following tests: the horizontal gaze nystag-
mus test, the walk and turn test and the one leg stand test. Id. Nystagmus is defined as
a persistent, rapid, involuntary and oscillatory movement of the eyeball. THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1333 (2d ed. 1987).
6. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 678. This statute provides: "(a) Offense defined - A person
shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle: (1)
while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safe driving." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731 (a)(1) (Supp. 1996).
7. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 678. Hayes appealed his conviction. Id.
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affirmed Hayes' conviction and sentence." The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court then granted allocatur in the case.9
On appeal, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether
the arresting officer violated Hayes' constitutional rights by fail-
ing to advise him of a right to refuse to perform the field sobriety
tests.10 Hayes argued that the right to refuse a field sobriety test
derives from the right against self-incrimination found in Article
I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Hayes also
argued that because the right to refuse a field sobriety test
exists, an individual suspected of driving under the influence of
alcohol must be informed of the right according to Miranda v.
Arizona .12
In dealing with Hayes' contentions, the court looked to the
Supreme Court of the United States for guidance.' 3 The court
noted that in Schmerber v. California,4 the United States
Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination protection found
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does
not bar from admission at trial incriminating physical evidence
unwillingly produced by the accused. 15 The Hayes court then
8. Id. The superior court found the trial court to have committed no error of law.
Id. at 677.
9. Id. Allocatur means the appeal is allowed, or that the court is taking the case
on appeal. BLAciKS LAw DIcTioNARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 678.
11. Id. at 679. Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[The
accused] cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
12. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 679. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In
Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that a person accused of a crime must be
advised of his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when in police custody.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, individuals cannot be compelled to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal
proceeding. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Under the Sixth Amendment, individuals have the
right to a speedy trial, an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against them and to have assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 679. The court looked to the Supreme Court due to its
understanding and interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave deference to the Supreme Court of the United States
with regard to the interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. This
deference was in part due to the textual similarity between the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
14. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment does not bar from admis-
sion at trial physical evidence produced by the accused even if incriminating).
15. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 679. The Hayes court also noted that the Schmerber court
relied on Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), in reaching its decision concerning
physical evidence. Id. In Holt, Justice Holmes stated:
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against him-
self is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communica-
tions from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
The objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his
features with a photograph in proof.
Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53.
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noted that the Fifth Amendment is substantially similar to Arti-
cle I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 16 As a result,
the court permitted the use of incriminating field sobriety test
evidence in the case against Hayes.'
7
Hayes also argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution pro-
vides a heightened form of protection against self-incrimination
as compared to the self-incrimination protection afforded under
the United States Constitution." In considering this claim, the
court referred to Commonwealth v. Edmunds,19 a prior Penn-
sylvania case in which a four-pronged analysis was developed to
deal with claims for such heightened protection.20  The court
noted that in determining whether a provision in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution affords greater protection than the protec-
tion offered under a similar provision in the United States
Constitution, under Edmunds a court must perform the follow-
ing: (1) a textual review of the provision; (2) a historical analysis
of the provision; (3) a review of similar case law from other juris-
dictions; and (4) a review of the provision from a public policy
perspective.2 '
In applying the first prong of the Edmunds test, the court dis-
cussed the holding in Commonwealth v. Swinehart,22 where it
also construed Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.' The Hayes court noted that the Swinehart court carefully
examined the privilege against self-incrimination in Penn-
sylvania, and compared Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution with the self-incrimination protection of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' The Hayes
court then noted that the Swinehart court wisely concluded that
a claim for heightened state constitutional protection against
16. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 679.
17. Id. at 682. The court concluded that since the evidence obtained from the field
sobriety tests was nontestimonial in nature, Miranda warnings were not required and
there was no violation of Hayes' privilege against self-incrimination. Id. In Miranda, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the warnings developed in that case only
apply to evidence in testimonial form. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
18. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 679-80. Hayes based this contention on the fact that there
are textual differences between Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
19. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
20. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 680. Concerning the four-pronged analysis in Edmunds,
the Hayes court stated: "Although it is not mandatory, we find this four-pronged test to
be quite useful in analyzing state constitutional claims and accordingly, will follow that
framework herein." Id.
21. Id. See Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
22. 664 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1995).
23. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 680. In Swinehart, the defendant was held in contempt of
court for refusing to testify against a co-conspirator. Swinehart, 664 A.2d at 957.
24. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 680.
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self-incrimination could not derive from a textual constitutional
analysis of the privilege under Article I, Section 9 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.25
The Hayes court moved on to the second prong of the Edmunds
test and examined the history of the self-incrimination privilege
in Pennsylvania.26 Upon analysis, the court noticed that there is
a tradition under Pennsylvania common law to protect the repu-
tation of an individual accused of a crime.27 The court went on to
qualify this protection, however, noting that the protection has
never been a concern when dealing with physical evidence
offered against the accused such as that acquired from an indi-
vidual's performance of a field sobriety test.28 The Hayes court
noted that the protection for the individual's reputation does not
arise where evidence of a nontestimonial nature is concerned.29
The court reasoned that while individuals compelled to perform
field sobriety tests may be concerned about their reputation, the
effect of the field sobriety test upon their reputation is no greater
than the effect caused to the reputation of an individual asked to
be fingerprinted or placed in a police lineup.30 As a result, the
court concluded Hayes' claim for heightened protection against
self-incrimination could not be based on a historical examination
of this privilege.31
25. Id. See Swinehart, 664 A.2d at 962. In Swinehart, the court stated that the
Edmunds analysis was the most thorough way of examining a claim for heightened state
constitutional protection. Swinehart, 664 A.2d at 961.
26. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 680. The Hayes court once again referenced the Swinehart
decision and noted that there is a historical preference for interpreting Article I, Section 9
of the Pennsylvania Constitution consistently with the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id.
27. Id. The court stated, "this concern for an individual's reputation is consistent
with our long established sense of a heightened awareness of personal privacy in Penn-
sylvania." Id. See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979); Commonwealth
v. Shaw, 383 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1978).
28. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 680 (citing Commonwealth v. Deren, 337 A.2d 600 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1975)(holding that use of accused's hair sample does not violate privilege
against self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 281 A.2d 852 (Pa. 1971)(holding
that fingerprints are not protected by privilege against self-incrimination because they
are considered nontestimonial evidence); Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 216 A.2d 50 (Pa.
1966)(holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse to appear in lineup); Com-
monwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1944Xholding that if defendant raises the issue of
sanity, defendant must submit to a court-ordered exam)).
29. Id. at 680. Testimonial evidence is defined as communicative evidence, as dis-
tinguished from physical or demonstrative evidence. BLAcKs LAw DIcrioNARY 556 (6th
ed. 1990).
30. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 681. The court noted that there is no heightened concern
for the reputation of an accused who is compelled to produce physical evidence such as
fingerprints or hair samples. Id.
31. Id.
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Moving on to the third prong of the Edmunds test, the court
examined the decisions of other states that have dealt with this
issue.3 2 The court found that the vast majority of states dealing
with this issue have come to conclusions consistent with prior
Pennsylvania case law. Specifically, the court determined that
all jurisdictions, with the exception of Oregon, have held that the
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked with
regard to a field sobriety test because of the nontestimonial
nature of the test.3 Evidence derived from field sobriety tests is
considered nontestimonial because the tests do not require the
accused to communicate a statement, whether it be a statement
of fact or belief.
3 5
The court then specifically examined People v. Ramirez,36 a
Colorado case that Hayes relied upon to argue that Miranda
warnings should be given to an individual asked to perform a
field sobriety test.3 7 Noting that the Colorado Supreme Court
32. Id.
33. Id. The court looked at the following cases: Stone v. City of Huntsville, 656 So.
2d 404 (Ala. 1994); State v. Corrigan, 228 A.2d 568 (Conn. 1967); Allred & DiAndrea v.
State, 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993); Coates v. State, 453 S.E.2d 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994);
People v. Krueger, 241 N.E.2d 707 (Il1. App. Ct. 1968); Heichelbech v. State, 281 N.E.2d
102 (Ind. 1972); State v. Faidley, 450 P.2d 20 (Kan. 1969); McAvoy v. State, 551 A.2d 875
(Md. 1989); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 438 N.E.2d 60 (Mass. 1982); Dixon v. State, 737
P.2d 1162 (Nev. 1987); State v. Arsenault, 336 A.2d 244 (N.H. 1975); People v. Boudreau,
115 A.2d 652 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Strickland, 173 S.E.2d 129 (N.C. 1970); State v. Zum-
mach, 467 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1991); City of Piqua v. Hinger, 238 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1968);
Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Trail v. State, 526 S.W.2d 127
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Erickson, 802 P.2d 111 (Utah 1990); State v. Lombard,
505 A.2d 1182 (Vt. 1985); City of Mercer Island v. Walker, 458 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1969). Id.
34. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 681. In State v. Dill, 870 P.2d 851 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that a police officer is required to give a verbal warning to a
suspected drunk driver before administering a field sobriety test. Dill, 870 P.2d at 854.
The applicable drunk-driving statute in Dill reads as follows:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon premises open to the public or the
highways of the state shall be deemed to have given consent to submit to field
sobriety tests upon the request of a police officer for the purpose of determining if
the person is under the influence of intoxicants if the police officer reasonably sus-
pects that the person has committed the offense of driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 or a municipal ordinance. Before
the tests are administered, the person requested to take the tests shall be informed
of the consequences of refusing to take or failing to submit to the tests under ORS
813.136.
OR. REv. STAT. § 813.135 (1995).
35. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). In Muniz, Justice Brennan
acknowledged the difference between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence. Id. Jus-
tice Brennan specifically stated: "His response was testimonial because he was required
to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief and, thus, was confronted
with the trilemma of truth, falsity, or silence, the historical abuse against which the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was aimed." Id. at 583.
36. 609 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1980).
37. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 681. Ramirez was the only case the court could find that
held Miranda warnings should be given when an accused is asked to perform a field
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case People v. Archuleta38 overruled Ramirez and held that
Miranda warnings are not required when one is asked to per-
form a field sobriety test, the court found Hayes' reliance on
Ramirez to be erroneous. 39 Therefore, the court's examination of
cases arising out of all other jurisdictions proved that Miranda
warnings are generally not required when one is asked to per-
form a field sobriety test.'
As to the last prong of the Edmunds test, the court listened to
Hayes' contention that as a matter of public policy, the protection
against self-incrimination should apply to field sobriety tests.41
The court found, however, that if such protection was declared to
be public policy, there would be a drastic change in the right
against self-incrimination that was not intended by the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.42 Specifically, field sobriety test evidence
would be useless due to the fact that it would be a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination to admit the evidence at
trial.43
In conclusion, the court noted that performing a field sobriety
test is a minimal invasion when compared to the test's objective
of making the highways safer by removing people under the
influence of intoxicants from the road.44 The court also noted
that since there is no implied consent law punishing a driver for
refusing to perform a field sobriety test in Pennsylvania, a driver
requested to perform the test is not really compelled to produce
self-damaging evidence.45
The privilege against self-incrimination, as a legal concept,
developed at a rather early time in the history of the United
sobriety test. Id. See Ramirez, 609 P.2d at 620 (holding that Miranda warnings are
applicable to field sobriety tests).
38. 719 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1986).
39. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 681. See Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1093 (holding that
Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is asked to perform a field sobriety
test).
40. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 682.
41. Id. Hayes argued that the court should reconsider the distinction between
physical evidence and communicative evidence with respect to the privilege against self-
incrimination, and thus overturn the precedent establishing the appropriateness of
allowing self-incriminating physical evidence to be admitted at trial while not allowing
the admission of self-incriminating communicative evidence. Id. Hayes claimed that the
recent advance in scientific evidence and analysis has produced evidence that is irrefuta-
ble and overwhelmingly incriminating. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 683.
44. Id.
45. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 683. The court failed to note that a suspected drunk driver
who refuses a field sobriety test will probably be asked to submit to a blood alcohol test,
and if he or she refuses this test, the individual's driver's license will be suspended for one
year under Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547 (1995).
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States. As early as 1802, in the case of Commonwealth v.
Gibbs,46 the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
privilege against self-incrimination is grounded in the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I,
Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.47 The issue in Gibbs
was whether Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion prohibits a judicial officer from asking an individual certain
questions that may lead to charging that person with a crime.48
The Supreme Court concluded that both the United States Con-
stitution and Pennsylvania Constitution do prohibit such ques-
tioning because the defendant's answers may lead to self-
incrimination.4 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was first faced with the
question of whether a defendant is required to produce docu-
ments at his or her own criminal trial that will aid in a conviction
in Boyle v. Smithman.50 In Boyle, Mr. Smithman refused to pro-
duce a written statement concerning his transportation and stor-
age of oil, claiming that he did not fall under the provisions of the
law requiring such a statement to be given.51 The prosecution
argued that such a statement was needed in order to protect the
public by compelling oil transporters to post a correct showing of
their transactions along with the amount of oil they were
holding.5 2
Upon hearing the case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rea-
soned that the action against Smithman was effectively penal in
nature. 53 As a result, Smithman could not be compelled to pro-
46. 4 U.S. 253 (1802).
47. Gibbs, 4 U.S. at 253. In Gibbs, the defendant was charged with violating an
election law after an appointed judge questioned the defendant's father concerning the
father's allegiance to the United States and the defendant made threatening remarks
towards the election official. Id.
48. Id. at 255.
49. Id.
50. 23 A. 397 (Pa. 1892). In Boyle, P.C. Boyle brought suit against John Smith-
man, an oil transporter, for refusing to provide a written statement listing the amount of
crude oil he transported. Boyle, 23 A. at 397. The Act of May 22, 1878 provided, in perti-
nent part, that every entity involved in the transportation or storage of petroleum must
post, in its principal place of business, a statement showing the amount of oil stored as
well as where the oil was stored. Id.
51. Id. Specifically, Mr. Smithman claimed that he was not engaged in transport-
ing and storing oil for producers as a public carrier, but, alternatively, that he was a
private purchaser and thus the law requiring a posting did not apply to him. Id. at 398.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 398. Justice Williams stated: -The act of 1878 is highly penal. This
action is in form a penal action. Its object is to punish the defendant for disobeying the
direction of the statute, by imposing penalties amounting to about $80,000." Id.
1997 979
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duce any documents that may aid in his prosecution. 4 The court
reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination, located in
Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, extended to
any written documents that may incriminate the individual on
trial. 5 5 The court then noted that any other holding would lead
to a defendant aiding in his or her own conviction. 56
Thirty years later, in Commonwealth v. Valeroso,5 7 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court considered the question of whether
defendants in criminal proceedings may properly be compelled to
testify against themselves either through oral testimony or the
production of written material that may establish their guilt.58
In Valeroso, a trial court convicted the defendant of murder in
the first degree when a letter from the victim's attorney was
admitted at trial to show that the defendant had the requisite
motive to murder the victim.
59
The court found that the historical privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution was one of the fundamental rights afforded by all courts of
English law.60 The court then found that under the privilege, an
individual accused of a crime can never be compelled to provide
self-incriminating evidence in a criminal action brought against
him or her.6 Additionally, the court found that ordering a
defendant to provide such evidence is unjust because the jury
may draw improper inferences at trial due to the defendant's
lack of cooperation.62 As a result, the court concluded that the
self-incriminating evidence barred from introduction at trial
under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
includes both the oral testimony of the defendant and the defend-
54. Id. An individual involved in a penal action is afforded the privilege against
self-incrimination because the action can result in the levying of fines and/or imprison-
ment. Id.
55. Boyle, 23 A. at 398. The court equated producing documents against oneself
with being compelled to testify against oneself. Id.
56. Id.
57. 116 A. 828 (Pa. 1922).
58. Valeroso, 116 A. at 829. The defendant in Valeroso had appealed his criminal
conviction, claiming that his forced production of a written document at trial, which
incriminated him, was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 829.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court noted that while it was not recognized in early common law, the
privilege against self-incrimination developed throughout the years in England and was
subsequently transferred to America. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 830. The court noted that several state supreme courts have recognized
that improper inferences may be drawn due to a defendant's lack of cooperation at trial.
Id. These improper inferences include the jury's inference that since a defendant is silent
or uncooperative, he or she must be hiding something or be guilty. Id.
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ant's production of written material.63 The court therefore
defined the testimonial evidence so as to include the letter writ-
ten by the accused in this case. 4
In Commonwealth v. Musto,65 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of whether the constitu-
tional immunity from self-incrimination applies to a court-
ordered physical exam performed on a defendant who raises the
defense of insanity.6 In Musto, the prosecutor anticipated that
the defendant would plead insanity and attempted to have alien-
ists67 examine the defendant in prison.6 The defendant's counsel
objected to this examination, claiming that it violated the defend-
ant's privilege against self-incrimination.69
The court found that compelling a criminal defendant to sub-
mit to a physical exam does not violate his or her constitutional
protection against self-incrimination as long as the exam does
not require the defendant to answer oral questions. 70 The court
reasoned that although a defendant's body may produce self-
incriminating evidence, such evidence is not barred from produc-
tion at trial under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution because the defendant is not required to make a statement
during the exam.7'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined whether the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination encom-
passes fingerprint evidence in Commonwealth v. Jefferson.72 In
Jefferson, the prosecution established that crime scene finger-
prints belonged to the defendant by forcing the defendant to be
fingerprinted in court and comparing these fingerprints to those
63. Valeroso, 116 A. at 831. Specifically, the court concluded that the demand
upon the defendant in this case to produce an incriminating letter was unconstitutional
and the trial court should not have been permitted this demand to be made. Id.
64. Id.
65. 35 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1944).
66. Musto, 35 A.2d at 309. The defendant in Musto shot and killed his wife and
was charged with first-degree murder. Id.
67. An alienist is one who specializes in the study of mental diseases. BLAcK's LAw
DICTIONARY 72 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Musto, 35 A.2d at 311. The prosecutor wanted a mental examination per-
formed on the defendant by doctors of the prosecutor's own choosing in order to counter
the defense physicians. Id.
69. Id. Specifically, defense counsel claimed that the use of the defendant's body as
evidence against him violated the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. In holding this way, the court did not deviate from the ancient principle of
delineating between testimonial evidence and nontestimonial evidence with respect to a
purely physical exam of an accused and a physical exam that requires the answering of
questions. Id.
72. 281 A.2d 852 (Pa. 1971). The defendant in Jefferson left his fingerprints in the
car of his stabbing victim. Id. at 856.
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removed from the crime scene.73 The defendant's counsel
claimed that such action violated the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.74
In addressing the defendant's claim, the court found finger-
prints to constitute a form of nontestimonial evidence that is not
afforded Fifth Amendment constitutional protection. 75 The court
held that evidence, in order to be barred by the privilege against
self-incrimination, must be of a communicative or testimonial
nature.76
Fifteen years later, in Commonwealth v. Romesburg,77 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court faced the question of whether
results obtained from the administration of a field sobriety test
are protected under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.7 Field sobriety testing on the defendant in Romesburg
resulted in a finding that he was legally intoxicated.79
At trial, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation under the Pennsylvania Constitution affords the same
protection to an individual as the privilege found under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 0 The court then
concluded that since evidence derived from a field sobriety test is
not evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature, it is
not protected under either the Pennsylvania or federal
Constitution. 1
In Commonwealth v. Bruder,$2 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court dealt with the issue of whether a defendant's answers to
73. Jefferson, 281 A.2d at 856. Jefferson was forced to be fingerprinted in court
because the technician who recorded his fingerprints earlier was unavailable to testify at
trial. Id.
74. Id. Specifically, defense counsel argued that the fingerprints elicited from the
prosecution at trial constituted testimonial evidence barred by the privilege against self-
incrimination. Id.
75. Id.
76. Jefferson, 281 A.2d at 856 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
77. 509 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
78. Romesburg, 509 A.2d at 414. In Romesburg, the defendant was pulled over by
a police officer for driving erratically. Id. After noticing that the defendant reeked of
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, the officer performed a field sobriety test
upon the defendant. Id.
79. Id. The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was determined to be .34%.
Id. The applicable blood alcohol limit for adults in Pennsylvania is .10%. 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3731 (aX4)(i) (Supp. 1996).
80. Romesburg, 509 A.2d at 414. Judge Wieand, writing for the majority, stated:
"While it is true that the guarantees provided by our state constitution may provide
greater protection than the guarantees of the federal constitution, the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania have consistently held that the protections against self-incrimination
afforded by the two constitutions are identical." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sell, 470
A.2d 457, 466-67 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-88 (Pa. 1981)).
81. Id. at 415.
82. 528 A.2d 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
982 Vol. 35:973
Commonwealth v. Hayes
questions posed for field sobriety test purposes are afforded the
privilege against self-incrimination.' The defendant in Bruder
was asked to recite the alphabet during a field sobriety test, at
which he was unsuccessful.8s At trial, the prosecution offered the
field sobriety evidence against the defendant.8 5
Applying previous case law, the court determined that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to physical
aspects of the field sobriety test.86 The court found the defend-
ant's recitation of the alphabet during the test, however, to be
protected under the privilege because of its testimonial nature.
87
Therefore, the court adhered to previous law delineating the dif-
ference between evidence of a testimonial and non-testimonial
nature when protecting the evidence under the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.
8 8
The Supreme Court of the United States determined whether
a videotape of a defendant performing various field sobriety tests
is afforded the privilege against self-incrimination in Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz.s9 The defendant in Muniz, who was trans-
ported to the police station for drunk driving, was asked several
questions at the station and required to perform various field
sobriety tests while being videotaped.90 At trial, the defendant
argued that the videotaped answers to the questions posed by
the police were inadmissible because they violated the privilege
against self-incrimination. 91
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the defendant's
answers to questions posed to him at the police station were
83. Bruder, 528 A.2d at 1388. In Bruder, a police officer stopped the defendant for
proceeding through a red light and subsequently requested him to perform a field sobriety
test due to his intoxicated appearance. Id. at 1386.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1388. The physical aspect of this field sobriety test was the walking of a
straight line. Id. The court found it well settled under Pennsylvania law that nontesti-
monial evidence obtained from a field sobriety test is not afforded the privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Benson, 421 A.2d 383, 387 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980)).
87. Id. The court specifically stated: "Although requiring Bruder to walk in a
straight line was a physical test which need not have been preceded by Miranda warn-
ings, we cannot readily reach the same conclusion regarding Bruder's recitation of the
alphabet." Id. at 1388.
88. Bruder, 528 A.2d at 1388.
89. 496 U.S. 582 (1990). In Muniz, the defendant was arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol. Id. at 582.
90. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 582. While being videotaped, police officers asked the
defendant his name, address, date of birth, eye color, height, weight, current age and the
date of his sixth birthday. Id. During the videotaping, the defendant made several self-
incriminating remarks. Id.
91. Id. The trial court admitted the whole tape at trial and the defendant was
found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
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inadmissible at trial.92 Specifically, the court found that testimo-
nial evidence obtained in the performance of a field sobriety test
was inadmissible, however any other evidence obtained from the
field sobriety tests was admissible at trial because of its non-tes-
timonial nature.93
On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the superior court
and determined that although a portion of the videotaped field
sobriety tests was admissible at the defendant's trial, the portion
of the videotape showing the defendant's responses to police
questioning was not admissible. s4 Thus, the supreme court once
again distinguished between evidence of a testimonial nature
and evidence of a nontestimonial nature when analyzing the pro-
tections afforded under the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
The question of whether motor vehicle drivers are afforded a
right to refuse a blood alcohol test in Pennsylvania was
addressed in Commonwealth v. Eisenhart.95 In Eisenhart, the
defendant was transferred to the hospital where his blood was
drawn and tested for alcohol content without his consent after
his involvement in a car accident.96 The results of the test later
proved that the defendant was legally intoxicated while driv-
ing.97 At the trial level, the results of the defendant's blood alco-
hol test were admitted.98
92. Id.
93. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 547 A.2d 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), aboc. denied, 559
A.2d 36 (Pa. 1989). On appeal, the superior court concluded that the answers to the ques-,
tions posed to the defendant were testimonial in nature. Muniz, 547 A.2d at 423. The
superior court then concluded that the audio portion of the videotape should be sup-
pressed. Id.
94. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 582. Justice Brennan tried to provide some guidance in
making the determination whether evidence is testimonial or nontestimonial by stating:
"To be testimonial, the communication must, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual
assertion or disclose information." Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210
(1988)). The court in Muniz held that while the defendant's response to the question
concerning his sixth birthday was testimonial and, thus, barred from admission in court,
the responses to the other questions concerning his date of birth, age, height, weight,
address and eye color were admissible, even though testimonial, because of the routine
nature of these questions and their use for booking purposes. Id. at 584.
95. 611 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1992). In Eisenhart, the defendant crashed his vehicle into a
cement wall. Id. at 681-82. Shortly thereafter, a police officer arrived on the scene and
administered two field sobriety tests to the defendant, which the defendant failed. Id.
96. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 682. Hospital personnel extracted defendant's blood
upon the advice of the District Attorney of York County. Id.
97. Id. The results of the blood test showed that defendant had a blood alcohol
level of .293%. Id. The blood alcohol limit in Pennsylvania is .10%. 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3731 (aX4Xi) (Supp. 1996).
98. Eienhart, 611 A.2d at 682. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant for
two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
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On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized the
Implied Consent Law, found in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code, to decide the case.' The court found that this law explic-
itly sanctions a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test. °00
As a result, although evidence derived from a blood test is
nontestimonial in nature, the defendant's refusal to submit to
the blood test should be honored and the evidence derived from
the test barred from admission at trial.1° 1
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination in Penn-
sylvania clearly illustrates that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court made the right decision in Commonwealth v. Hayes. All of
the cases that arose in the Commonwealth and in federal court
prior to Hayes have been similarly resolved as to the issue of
whether there is a right to refuse a nontestimonial field sobriety
test. The courts have concluded that the evidence obtained from
a field sobriety test is nontestimonial in nature and therefore not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 0 2 This con-
clusion is reached either under Article I, Section 9 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution or under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The question remains, however, whether the court should be
applauded for this strict adherence to previous case law and tra-
dition or be chastised for missing the point of this decision. The
Hayes court decided that there is no right to refuse a field sobri-
ety test by applying the four principles derived from Edmunds.03
First, the Hayes court appropriately noted that the textual differ-
ences between Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
are so minute as to make no difference in the application of
either section to the privilege against self-incrimination. 0 4 This
99. Id. at 683 (citing 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547 (1995)). The Implied Consent Law
provides that a driver may refuse to submit to a chemical test. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547
(1995). This refusal, however, is punishable by a one year suspension of the driver's
license to operate a motor vehicle. Id.
100. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d at 683.
101. Id. The court noted that since the defendant explicitly refused the blood test,
the results of the test should have been barred from admission under the Implied Consent
Law, regardless of whether the evidence was testimonial or nontestimonial in nature. Id.
102. See Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Jefferson, 281 A.2d 852 (Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1944);
Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 116 A. 828 (Pa. 1922); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 509
A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Bruder, 528 A.2d 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987).





is a fact that cannot be disputed in an attempt to criticize the
court's analysis.
Second, the court astutely analyzed the historical development
of Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. A careful
examination of the historical background of the privilege against
self-incrimination in Pennsylvania reveals that while there is a
tradition within the Commonwealth of protecting the reputation
of an individual accused of a crime, the tradition only protects
such an individual from self-incriminating testimonial evidence
offered against him or her at trial and not self-incriminating evi-
dence of a nontestimonial nature. 0 5 The Hayes court reasoned
that evidence obtained from a field sobriety test that does not
require testimonial responses is admissible evidence from which
a defendant should not be afforded self-incrimination
protection. I °6
Third, the court's recognition that every state, with the excep-
tion of Oregon, has also found no right to refuse a field sobriety
test and, thus, no constitutional bar to introducing evidence
obtained from such a test at trial lends great support to the
Hayes decision. 10 7  The persuasiveness of other jurisdictions
throughout the country cannot be discounted, and the Hayes
court's citation to at least twenty-one decisions from neighboring
jurisdictions in agreement with its decision is notable. 108
The brilliance of the Hayes court's analysis, however, probably
stops here. Upon applying the fourth prong of the Edmunds test,
the court erred in holding that there are no public policy con-
cerns that would require a departure from the historical analysis
of the privilege against self-incrimination. 0 9
The Hayes court failed to recognize the reality involved in the
case of a suspected drunk driver. While it is true that a person
asked to perform a field sobriety test is not directly compelled to
submit to such a test by the terms of Pennsylvania's implied con-
sent law, suspected drunk drivers are indirectly compelled to
submit to such a test for the following reasons."I0 First, when a
person is stopped for suspicion of driving under the influence of
105. Id. See Commonwealth v. Eisenhart, 611 A.2d 681 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth
v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 281 A.2d 852 (Pa.
1971); Commonwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1944); Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 116
A. 828 (Pa. 1922); Commonwealth v. Romesburg, 509 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Bruder, 528 A.2d 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
106. Hayes, 674 A.2d at 681.
107. Id. at 681-82.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 682.
110. Id. There is no legislative requirement compelling a suspect to submit to a
field sobriety test. Id.
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alcohol, he or she is likely to do whatever the police officer asks,
and thus submit to a field sobriety test out of fear or intimida-
tion. Second, in the event that the accused refuses to perform
the field sobriety test, though consent to testing does not lead to
an automatic license suspension, upon withholding consent the
accused will be asked to submit to a chemical test. Under Penn-
sylvania law, the consequences of withholding consent to a chem-
ical test are a mandatory twelve month suspension of driving
privileges and the admission of such refusal as evidence against
oneself."' An accused drunk driver in the state of Pennsylvania
is, therefore, compelled to incriminate himself or herself, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has condoned this indirect form of
self-incrimination by affirming Hayes' conviction.
Sean M. Girdwood
111. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1547(b), (e) (1995).
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